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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Appeal arises from a final Judgment of the Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Michael

R.

Murphy

presiding.

The Utah

Court

of Appeals

has

jurisdiction over this Appeal, pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The present proceeding before this Court involves an initial
Appeal

by

Appellants

Christensen

&

Kimball,

a

Utah

general

partnership, and Victor M. Kimball, individually and as general
partner of said partnership.

In that Appeal, the Appellants seek

review of the Trial Court's finding

and

judgment relative to

alleged misrepresentations by Appellants as to the size of the lot
purchased by the Plaintiffs.

With regard to sugh Appeal, the

following issues are raised:
1.

Whether or not there was sufficient evidence upon

which the Trial Court could find that a negligent misrepresentation
had occurred.
2.

Whether or not there was sufficient evidence upon

which the Trial Court could find that the Plaintiffs relied upon
any such misrepresentations.
3.

Whether or not there was sufficient evidence upon

which the Trial Court could find that the reliance, if any, of the
Plaintiffs was reasonable.
4.

Whether or not the finding of the Trial Court with

respect to damages relative to such negligence misrepresentation
were consistent with and supported by the evidence.
1

In response to the original Appeal, the Plaintiffs filed a
Cross-Appeal seeking a review of the findings of the Trial Court
with respect to the issue of the implied warranty of habitability.
An additional Cross-Appeal was also filed by Defendant Spectrum
Development, also regarding the issue of the implied warranty of
habitability.

Those

issues will not be addressed

by these

Appellants in this Brief, but will be left to be addressed by the
remaining parties and in the Reply Brief of these Appellants.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
This matter

involves

various

disputes

arising

from

the

purchase of a new home by the Plaintiffs. The home was constructed
by the Defendant Burningham & Kimball, a Utah general partnership.
The lot upon which the home is located was originally owned by the
Appellant, Christensen & Kimball, a Utah general partnership, with
Victor M. Kimball as the general partner.
Almost
Plaintiffs

immediately
claim

upon

that they

the purchase
experienced

of

the home, the

numerous

difficulties

relative to the construction of the home, including such things as
inadequate heating and air conditioning systems, frozen pipes and
water in the basement. For these problems, the Plaintiffs claimed
various breaches of express and implied warranties, including the
warranty of habitability.
In addition, the Plaintiffs allege that they discovered that
the lot upon which the home was located was significantly smaller
than had been represented to them by both the sales literature
prepared by the seller, as well as the representations of the
2

Defendant Victor Kimball. For this problem, the Plaintiffs claimed
damages as the result of negligent misrepresentation.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BY TRIAL COURT.
The case was tried to the Court over a period of several days.

Because of the Trial Court's schedule, there were often large
delays or interruptions between trial days.
Trial Court was issued on July 31, 1992.

The decision of the

The Trial Court granted

judgment to the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants on the issue
of the negligent misrepresentation with respect to the lot size.
The Trial Court also found that an implied warranty of habitability
exists in the State of Utah and was applicable to the facts of this
case, that various items in the home had not been constructed in a
workmanlike

manner

but

warranty of habitability.

that

such

defects

did

not

breach

the

Specifically, the Trial Court found that

the defects and problems experienced by the Plaintiffs did not make
the home uninhabitable, as that term is defined in the law.
In accordance with the ruling of the Court, on January 14,
1993, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered and a
Judgment rendered in the sum of $21,769.90 in favor of Plaintiffs.
As indicated, the money judgment related solely to the issue of the
negligent misrepresentation with respect to the lot size.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
As indicated above, the original Appeal raised only issues
relative to the negligent misrepresentation as to the size of the
lot.

Accordingly, the following is a statement of only those facts

which relate to the misrepresentation claim, and not to the breach

3

of warranty claims.
of

the

record,

All references shall be to the numbered pages

inasmuch

as

the

Transcript

has

been

numbered

serially as a part of the record.
1.

Plaintiffs

are

husband

and

wife.

Their

prior

experience in the purchase of real estate involved purchases of
prior residences.
2.

(R. 1697-98.)

The home in question is located at 2364 Scenic Drive

in Salt Lake City.

The home faces essentially eastward toward the

street with the backyard extending in a westerly direction.

The

property is situated in the foothills and slopes downward in a
westerly direction.

It overlooks a large office building known as

the "GMAC" Building, which is located on Foothill Drive.
3.

Plaintiffs first noticed the home by observing a

large "For Sale" sign on the balcony of the home.
4.

(R. 1698.)

At their first inspection, Plaintiffs inspected the

outside of the home but were unable to gain entrance to the home
because the same was locked.

There was a lock box on the home by

which realtors could gain access to the home.
5.
Richard

(R. 1701.)

Plaintiffs were working with a licensed realtor,

Strong,

the

father

of the Plaintiff, Vicki

Forsberg.

Plaintiffs enlisted Mr. Strong's assistance in gaining access to
the home through the lock box.
6.

(R. 1701.)

When the Plaintiffs first gained access to the home,

it was in the company of their realtor, Mr. Strong.

Upon their

first visit, they obtained a "fact sheet", which had been prepared

4

and left in the home for use by prospective buyers.

(R. 1702;

Exhibit P-27.)
7.

The fact sheet was originally prepared by a realtor

hired by the Defendant, Victor Kimball. Mr. Kimball had no hand in
the preparation of the document.
8.

(R. 1161.)

Throughout the process of purchasing the home in

question, the Plaintiffs were assisted
realtor, Mr. Strong.

and advised by their

(R. 1787.)

9. At the time of the initial inspection of the home by
the Plaintiffs, there were no stakes or other markers to show the
boundaries of the lot.
10.

(R. 1713.)

Because the backyard of the home looked downward

upon the roof of the GMAC Building, previous real estate agents
hired by the Defendant Kimball had suggested planting trees to
obscure the view of the that building. Accordingly, a row of trees
was planted on the west side of the home, between the home and the
GMAC Building, but without reference to the actual boundaries of
the lot which the Plaintiffs purchased.
11.

(R. 2101-02.)

As it regards the size of the lot in question, the

Plaintiffs and the Defendants had only one conversation; that
conversation occurred on the second visit of the Plaintiffs to the
home. Present at this visit were the Plaintiffs, their real estate
agent Mr. Strong, and the Defendant Victor Kimball.

(R. 1713.)

The Plaintiff Farrell Forsberg recalls the conversation, (R. 1714),
but the Plaintiff Vicki Forsberg does not.

5

(R. 1336.)

12.
17, 1987.

Plaintiffs purchased the home on or about November

(Exhibit P-28.)
13.

Subsequent to the purchase of the home, Plaintiff

had the backyard boundary line surveyed and learned that the actual
boundary line was nearer to the home than the row of trees.

(R.

1720.)
14.

Prior

to

the

filing

of

this

litigation,

the

Plaintiffs removed the row of trees, (R. 1798), and extended the
yard beyond the row of trees and beyond the actual boundary line.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The specific findings of the Trial Court with respect to the
claim of negligent misrepresentation are Findings 24 through 27,
inclusive.

(R. 696-97.)

It is the position of these Appellants

that there is insufficient evidence upon which the Trial Court
could make these findings and that they are, therefore, in error.
Specifically, the Trial Court found that the combination of
the fact sheet, (Exhibit P-27), and the planting of poplar trees as
a "sight barrier" between the subject home and the GMAC Building
constituted
However,

a

the

misrepresentation
Plaintiffs

freely

as

to

admit

the

size

that

of

in

the

the

lot.

single

conversation with Defendant Kimball on the issue of the size of the
backyard, it was made clear that no one knew the exact boundaries
of the backyard and that the trees did not represent the boundary
line of the lot. The record is, further, clear that the dimensions
on the fact sheet "98' x 102'" referred to the lot size itself and
that the actual dimensions of the lot are 98 f x 102'.
6

The record shows that the Plaintiffs were well aware that the
exact dimensions of the lot were not known and that they could, if
they chose to do so, have required a survey of the property. The
Plaintiffs were, at all times, represented by a realtor who was
familiar with the provisions of the Earnest Money Agreement for
calling for a survey if desired.

The Plaintiffs testified, over

and over again, that the size of the yard was critical to them; and
yet they did nothing whatsoever to learn the size of the lot.
Accordingly,

their

reliance

upon

any representations

of the

Defendants were unreasonable and unjustified.
Finally, in Finding 27, (R. 696), the Trial Court made a
specific finding that the actual property would have contained
9,996 square feet.

The Trial Court further found that the actual

size of the lot was 4,628 square feet.

There is absolutely no

evidence in the record to support these conclusions.

As will be

shown, the Plaintiffs admitted that they thought the western
boundary of the lot to run within a few feet of the line of trees.
The testimony of the Plaintiffs is that the trees were within 45
feet of the home.

The Trial Court, accordingly, made findings

which extend beyond the evidence.
The result was that the Trial Court granted damages for the
lost square footage which is wholly unsupported and constitutes
nothing more than a guess as to the difference between the square
footage represented and the square footage granted.

Since the

calculation of damages is beyond any evidence in the record, it
cannot be allowed to stand.
7

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT A MISREPRESENTATION HAD OCCURRED.
In this case these Appellants claim that no misrepresentation
occurred as to the boundaries of the lot being purchased and that
the Trial Court's finding in that regard was in error.

In so

claiming, Appellants are aware of the applicable law and standard
of review.

In Harline v. Campbell, 728 P.2d 980 (Utah, 1986) the

Utah Supreme Court stated:
Under familiar rules of appellate review, the Court views
the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment
of the trial court, and the findings of the trial court
will not be disturbed unless there is no substantial
record evidence to support them. Id. at 98 2.
Appellants are also aware that the burden is placed upon them
to demonstrate to this Court the error of the Trial Court.

In Reed

v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182 (Utah, 1991) the Supreme Court stated:
In order to challenge the court's findings of fact, the
defendant must marshall all of the evidence in favor of
the findings and then demonstrate that even when
reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the
findings.
Appellants,

therefore,

have

included

in

this

Brief

all

references to the issue of lot size so as to demonstrate that the
evidence

is wholly

misrepresentation.

lacking to

support a finding

of

negligent

The evidence in the record relating to the

issue of lot size is limited to the testimony of two witnesses,
Farrell Forsberg, the Plaintiff, and Victor Kimball, the Defendant.
No other witnesses testified that they had any discussions with or
knowledge of the issue of the size of the lot.
8

In addition, there

are only two exhibits upon which the Plaintiffs rely relative to
the issue of lot size, Exhibits P-27 and P-35.

Copies of both

Exhibits are attached hereto as Appendices 1 and 2.
The testimony of Farrell Forsberg is that he received a copy
of Exhibit P-27, the fact sheet, on his second visit to the home.
(R. 1702.)

At the time of that visit, he was in the company of his

wife and his realtor, Mr. Strong.

(R. 1701.)

The fact sheet

refers to the size of the lot with the following language:
Yard Size: 98 • x 102 • , flat backyard with room for a
pool. (Appendix 1.)
There

is no testimony

from

any party to the effect that the

language used on the fact sheet was discussed or that the parties
came to any understanding as to what was meant by the words used on
the fact sheet.
Mr. Forsberg testified, in response to questioning by his
counsel, that the size of the yard was an important consideration.
In fact, Mr. Forsberg testified, on numerous occasions, as follows:
It was a very critical feature. We wanted a home that we
could live in comfortably inside, but it was very
important to us that children, little children, could
enjoy . . . .
(R. 1709, L. 18-21.)
At no time did Mr. Forsberg testify that he told any Defendant
that the lot or yard size was a "critical feature".

When asked

about the discussion with Mr. Kimball about the size of the lot,
Mr. Forsberg testified that they talked about the size of the lot
but did not testify that the fact sheet was discussed.

(R. 1713-

14.) Mr. Forsberg further stated, on questioning from his counsel,
that the discussion was as follows:
9

Question:

And did you have occasion to talk with Vic
Kimball about the size of the yard on that
first visit?

Answer:

Yes, we did.

Question:

And would you tell me what Mr- Kimball said
and what you said as best you can, about the
size of the lot?

Answer:

The
but
the
25;

exact wording at this time I can't recall,
I do remember a very critical issue was
size of the backyard. (R. 1713, L. 24R. 1714, L. 1-2; 14-20.)

Mr. Forsberg also testified about the significance of the line
of poplar trees which had been planted at the back of the lot to
obscure the view of the top of the GMAC Building.

Again, on direct

examination, Mr. Forsberg stated:
Question:

Did you have some discussion with Mr. Kimball
about those poplar trees?

Answer:

Yes, I did.

Question:

Tell us what you said and what he said, as best you
can.

Answer:

Well, I was trying to confirm the boundaries of the
backyard, and I asked him about the poplar t r e e s .
And he related to me that the poplar trees were a
reflection of the backyard, roughly the back w e s t
boundary of the yard.

Answer:

He described that the poplar trees - because there
were no landscape markers there, I was concerned
as to exactly where the back corners and back
property line were, and he assured me that the
poplar trees were within the property of the
residence for sale.

Question:

Within the property?

Answer:

Correct.
10

Question:

But not at the exact boundary line?

Answer:

No.

(R. 1718, L. 2-23.)

The only other testimony Mr. Forsberg gave on this issue was
in response to cross examination.

At that time, Mr. Forsberg

testified as to the following points:
1. Although the size of the lot was critical, he did not
discuss that with his realtor, Mr. Strong:
Question: Ok. At that time did you have a discussion with Mr.
Strong that the backyard of this home was
supposed to be 98' x 102'?
Answer:
2.

I don't recall that being specifically addressed.
(R. 1790, Line 6-10.)
The

exact measurements

of the

yard

were not

important. All that was important was that the yard be "spacious",
a fact which was never discussed with Defendants:
Answer:

I assume so.
I don't recall focusing on those
specific numbers.
But again, my impression was
that this was a spacious yard.

Question: You have used in your testimony - well, strike
that. You said you assumed it was spacious yard.
Is that what it says to you?
Answer:
3.

This would. —

(R. 1791, L. 2-8.)

Mr. Forsberg admitted that he had no specific

definition or dimension which constituted "spacious" but that at
least 40 feet of backyard was necessary:
Question:
Answer:

40?
Probably. As you begin getting into that range.
That is beginning to get into the range of what we
perceived to be a spacious backyard.

Question: So at least 40 feet would be necessary for it to be
spacious?
11

Answer:
4.

In that neighborhood, yes.

(R. 1792, L. 5-13.)

Although the size of the yard was critical, Mr.

Forsberg did not request or cause a survey of the property to be
done and did not speak with Mr. Dick Strong about the possibility
of a survey.

(R. 1796-97.)

5. Mr. Forsberg admitted that the distance from the back
door of the home to the farthest poplar tree was approximately 45
feet.

This distance is marked on Exhibit P-35.

(R. 164, L. 13-15;

Appendix 2.)
6.

Mr. Forsberg testified that he had no idea exactly

what was a big enough yard and that it was just a "feeling".

(R.

1803A.)
7.

Mr. Forsberg admitted that Mr. Kimball had indicated

that he did not know where the boundary lines of the property were:
Question: Now, did the word "roughly" to you indicate that
Mr. Kimball didn't exactly know?
Answer:

He did not know what the exact property line was.
(R. 1807, L. 17-20.)

Question: And therefore, based upon the fact that you knew
Mr. Kimball didn't exactly know either, did you ask
for a survey of the property?
Answer:
8.

We did not.

(R. 1808, L. 5-8.)

Mr. Forsberg testified that he made an assumption

that the backyard of the home was somewhere near 98 feet deep, but
that he did not address that issue with the Defendants:
Question: Therefore, you would have to agree with me,
wouldn't you, that you assumed that the backyard of
this home went somewhere near 98 feet; correct?

12

Answer:

I must have made that assumption.
That was not
specifically addressed with the Kimballs.
(R.
1810, L. 12-16.)

9.

Mr. Forsberg did admit that he did not believe the

yard went down to the GMAC Building on the west but that the
boundary line, in order to go out 98 feet, would have to extend
beyond the poplar trees by at least another 45 feet.
10.

(R. 1811.)

Mr. Forsberg testified that Mr. Kimball gave him the

impression that the property line was within a couple of feet of
the poplar trees:
Question: Do you recall telling me in the deposition that the
boundary was probably a couple of feet behind or to
the west of where the poplar trees were planted?
Answer:

Yes.

Question: Is that still your testimony today?
Answer:

A couple of feet, several feet. Whether that's two
or three or five, he told me that th% property line
was beyond the trees.

Question: A couple of feet; right?
Answer:

Yes.

The testimony of Mr. Kimball on the issue of the size of the
lot is not inconsistent with the testimony given by Mr. Forsberg.
Mr. Kimball testified that, at the time of his meeting with Mr.
Forsberg, he did not know where the back corners of the lot were.
(R. 1161.)

Mr. Kimball also testified that, in response to a

question from Mr. Forsberg about where the back property was, he
stated:

"I said 'No, I do not know where the property line is.'"

(R. 762, L. 17-19.)

13

Regarding the issue of the trees, in relation to the back
property line, Mr. Kimball made the following points:
1.

The trees were planted as far back as possible,

without regard to the boundary line of the property:
Question: What else did
Anything else?
Answer:

you

say

regarding

that

issue?

Well, I told him that the trees were planted on the
back of the property, as far back as we could
possibly go, no knowing exactly where the trees
were in relation to the back lot line.

Question: Did you have the trees planted?
Answer:

I - I called the landscaper and asked him to plant
them.

Question: Did you tell the landscaper to plant the trees on
your lot or off your lot?
Answer:

I just told him to plant them as far back as they
could.

Question: Do you know whether or not they planted them on the
lot or off the lot?
Answer:

I do not, no.

Question: Did you intend, by putting those trees back there,
to indicate where the back lot line was?
Answer:

No, I did not.

Question: Did you ever tell Mr. Forsberg that the trees were
within the boundary lines of the lot?
Answer:

No, I did not.

Question: Why didn't you tell him that?
Answer:

I did not know where the back property line was.
(R. 1162-63.)

14

Regarding whether or not the backyard was intended to be
represented as extending 98 feet from the foundation of the home,
Mr. Kimball stated:
Question: Did you ever discuss with Mr. Forsberg the fact
that the backyard extended 98 feet or 102 feet
beyond where you were standing when you were
looking at it?
Answer:

I did not.

Question: Approximately how close to the General Motors
Building would that 98 or 102 feet have been?
Answer:

Well, I think it would have been in the parking lot
of General Motors.

Question: And approximately how far beyond the trees would
that have gone?
Answer:

Probably the whole lot size again further.
1164, L. 9-22.)

(R.

The foregoing is a complete recitation of the testimony and
documentary

evidence

regarding

the

size

Plaintiffs1 claim of misrepresentation.

of

the- lot

and

the

From such evidence one can

determine that a single conversation occurred between Plaintiffs
and Defendant regarding the size of the lot. In that conversation,
both parties admitted knowing that neither party knew where the
boundary lines of the lot were.

Both parties admitted that there

were no markers to delineate the boundary line.

Mr. Forsberg

stated that he wanted a "spacious11 yard but admitted he did not
define

what

he

meant

by

spacious

and

did

not

indicate

his

definition to Mr. Kimball.
Mr. Forsberg never testified that he thought the backyard of
his home extended to the GMAC Building.

Rather, he testified that

he did not believe that it extended to the GMAC Building.
15

Yet, as

testified by Mr. Kimball, 98 feet would put the backyard of Mr.
Forsberg home in the middle of the GMAC property.
Interwoven through this evidence is the undisputed fact that
the

exact

dimensions

ascertainable

by

the

of

the

lot

Plaintiffs.

were

known

Exhibit

P-l

and/or
shows

readily
that

the

dimensions of the lot were 122.40 feet across the front, 102.38
feet down the south boundary, 77.85 feet across the western side
and 98.23 feet along the northern boundary.

Accordingly, the fact

sheet showing the dimensions to be 98' x 102' was not incorrect.
In addition, the Plaintiffs were, at all times, represented by
a real estate agent.

The agent had the multiple listing service

book with him, which contained the exact dimensions of the lot.
The real estate agent was aware that, if the exact dimensions of
the lot were important to the Plaintiffs, a survey could have been
required.

The real estate agent knew that the Earnest Money Form,

Exhibit P-28, contains a place where a survey can be required.
There was no misrepresentation as to the size of the property
which Plaintiffs purchased.

There was a discussion about where the

backyard ended; which discussion centered around the fact that
neither

party

testimony

does

knew
one

where

the

find

any

boundary
statement

was.
which

Nowhere
amounts

in
to

the
a

representation by the Defendants that the backyard of the home
extended some 98 feet from the foundation.
The record is clearly insufficient to support Findings 24 and
25, (R. 696) made by the Trial Court or to support the conclusion
that

such

Findings

amounted

to

16

a

misrepresentation.

It

is

respectfully suggested that because this matter was tried over a
period of several days, spanning a couple of months, the Trial
Court

simply

did

not have

a clear recollection

testimony which had been given by the parties.

of the

exact

The Trial Court's

error should be reversed by this Court.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT
PLAINTIFFS• RELIANCE UPON THE REPRESENTATIONS
REGARDING LOT SIZE WAS REASONABLE.
The

concept

of

negligent

misrepresentation

was

first

enunciated by this Court in Jardine v. Brunswick Corporation, 18
Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659 (1967)-

In that case, the Utah Supreme

Court stated:
Where one having a pecuniary interest in a transaction,
is in a superior position to know material facts, and
carelessly or negligently makes a false representation
concerning them, expecting the other party to rely and
act thereon, and the other party reasonably does so and
suffers loss in that transaction, the representor can be
held responsible if the other elements of fraud are also
present. Id. at 662.
See, also, Christenson v. Com. Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302
(Utah, 1983).
However, the law on negligent misrepresentation does not leave
the supposed victim of the representation without duty to inquire.
As was stated by the Supreme Court in Jardine:
In regard to this alleged cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation, it is pertinent to keep in mind that
there is recognized a defense somewhat analogous to
contributory negligence in other tort actions. The one
who complains of being injured by such a false
representation cannot heedlessly accept as true whatever
is told to him but has the duty of exercising such degree
of care to protect his own interests as would be
exercised bv an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person
under the circumstances; and if he fails to do so, is
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precluded from holding someone else to account for the
consequences of his own neglect. Id. at 662- (Emphasis
added.)
This concept has remained unchanged in the case law since
Jardine. At first blush, the decision in Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d
1239 (Utah, 1980), would appear to relieve the supposed victim of
a

negligent misrepresentation

himself.

from the obligation to protect

However, even in Dugan, the Supreme Court noted the

responsibility of the vendee of real property as follows:
Furthermore, a vendee of real property, in the absence of
facts putting him on notice, has no duty to investigate
to determine what the vendor has misrepresented the area
conveyed. Id. at 1247. (Emphasis added.)
Simply put, the Court in Dugan was stating the obvious, i.e., that
the facts of that particular case did not place upon that vendee
the responsibility to investigate further.
The differences between the Dugan case and the case at hand
are striking.

In Dugan, a specific representation was made as to

an exact amount of property.

The representation made, which was

undisputed in Dugan, was that there were 22 3/4 acres of property.
No such similar representation was made by the Defendants herein.
In addition, in Dugan, it was admitted that the parties did not
fully inspect the property and that they could not see all of the
property from where they were standing.
In the case at hand, no specific representation as to the size
of the lot was ever made other than the true statement in the fact
sheet that the dimensions were "98 • x 102l,f.

Instead, there were

only vague references to an inexact boundary line, the location of
which both parties agreed they did not know.
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At the time this

discussion occurred, the parties were looking at the entire parcel.
Finally,

it was readily

apparent, both to Forsbergs and to

Kimballs, that a backyard which excluded 98 feet beyond the house
was not physically possible.
That the law with respect to the duty of a party to inquire
has not changed is evident from the subsequent decision of the Utah
Supreme Court in Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P. 2d 124
(Utah, 1982).

This decision was handed down after Duaan decision.

In Mikkelson, the vendee of real property
misrepresentation.

claimed negligent

The Supreme Court, in striking down such a

claim, stated:
While plaintiff may have initially received false
information, he cannot reasonably continue to rely on it
once true and corrected information is furnished him . .
.. Id. at 126.
The Supreme Court in Mikkelson then went on to cite the relevant
language from the Jardine decision regarding the duty of a victim
of misrepresentation to inquire.
Other decisions have given some assistance in determining
under what circumstances a party has a duty to reasonably inquire.
For example, in Haaar v. Moblev, 638 P.2d 127 (Wyo. , 1981), the
Wyoming Supreme Court stated:
. . . that this Court was merely saying that when a party
has been made aware of some inconsistencies between the
facts and the representations of the parties, some
investigation is called for and required.
Here, the
Mobleys had no inkling that the Hagars1 statements were
false; and accordingly had no duty to investigate
further. Id. at 133. (Emphasis added.)
In

the

case

at

hand,

the

testimony

of

the

Plaintiffs

themselves shows the numerous "inconsistencies" which imposed upon
19

them a duty to reasonably inquire as to the exact boundaries of the
property.

From the outset, Farrell Forsberg testified that the

size of the yard was a "very critical feature".

(R. 1709.)

When

asked to tell what was said by Mr. Kimball regarding the size of
the lot, Mr. Forsberg stated:
The exact wording at this time I can't recall, but I do
remember a very critical issue was the size of the
backyard. (R. 1714.)
Mr. Forsberg further admitted that he was told that the poplar
trees were "roughly the back west boundary of the yard".

(R.

1718.)
Most importantly, Mr. Forsberg agreed with Mr. Kimball that
the real message given at the time the parties inspected the
property was that no one knew where the boundary lines of the
property were and that, other than a general discussion regarding
the backyard, no specific representations were made. Mr. Forsberg
testified as follows:
He [Kimball] did not know what the exact property line
was.
«

. .

Question: And therefore, based upon the fact that you
knew Mr. Kimball didn't exactly know either,
did you ask for a survey of the property?
Answer:

We did not.

In substance

and

(R. 1807-08.)

in fact, Mr. Forsberg merely

made an

assumption, based upon his own observation, without reliance upon
the statements of Mr. Kimball or the fact sheet.
that specific question, Mr. Forsberg stated:

20

In response to

Question: Therefore, you would have to agree with me,
wouldn't you, that you assumed that the
backyard of this home went somewhere near 98
feet; correct?
Answer:

I must have made that assumptionThat was
not specifically addressed with the Kimballs.
(R. 1810-)

The Plaintiffs were literally surrounded by vagueness and
inconsistencies which demanded that they make further inquiry into
this so-called "critical" issue.

The Trial Court could come to no

other conclusion than that a reasonably prudent person would have
a duty to further inquire.

Such inquiry would have been simple for

Plaintiffs to accomplish.
The decision in Jardine holds that the applicable burden of
proof in negligent misrepresentation cases is clear and convincing.
The specific testimony of the parties has been set out .in toto in
this Brief.

Clearly, such burden has not been met, given the total

circumstances, and giving every benefit of every doubt to the
Plaintiffs.

The Trial Court's error in holding that there was

justifiable and reasonable reliance should be reversed.
POINT III
THE RECORD DOES NOT JUSTIFY AN AWARD
OP DAMAGES IN THE SUM OP $21,769.90.
It is axiomatic in the law that any award of damages must be
supportable

by the evidence presented

at trial.

It is also

apparent in the case at hand that the Trial Court had no record or
evidence upon which to base a calculation of damages resulting in
a judgment of $21,767.90.

The Trial Court adopted the argument of

the Plaintiffs that they were to have received 9,996 square feet of
property but that they received only 4,628 square feet of property.
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(Finding of Fact No. 27, R. 696.)

There is no support for this

Finding for the following reasons:
1.

The Findings of Fact of the Trial Court contain no

finding that the backyard of the resident was represented to be 98"
x 102 • . The Trial Court failed to make such a finding or to state
the basis upon which such a finding was founded. The testimony of
the Plaintiff was that he did not rely upon the measurements of 98'
x 102' as set out in the fact sheet.

(Exhibit P-27.)

In Mr.

Forsberg's own words:
It's exact measurements I don't recall focusing on. I
was left with the impression that it was a sizable back
yard. Those numbers seem to me a sizable yard. (R.
1790.)
In another place, Mr. Forsberg admitted that he simply assumed that
the

yard

was

measurements.

"spacious"

without

confirming

any

specific

(R. 1791.) Accordingly, there is no fact upon which

the Trial Court could make a determination that the backyard of the
home should have measured 98' x 102'.

It then follows that a

calculation of a judgment amount based upon such a finding also
must fail.
2.

The

Findings

of

the

Trial

Court

contain

no

determination that the fact sheet (Exhibit P-27) was, in and of
itself, misleading or ambiguous.
"Yard Size:

The fact sheet simply says:

98' x 102', flat backyard with room for a pool".

As

has been shown by Exhibit P-2, the actual dimensions of the lot
which was purchased by the Plaintiffs measures 98 feet on one side
and 102 feet on the other, yielding a total square footage in the
lot of 9,885 square feet.

This square footage was not a matter of
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testimony but is determined by a simple mathematical calculation
from the dimensions found in the record.

Therefore, if the Trial

Court's finding was that the Plaintiffs were entitled to 9,996
square feet of real estate, the facts show that they received
nearly that amount.

If anything, the Plaintiffs would be entitled

to a judgment of the difference between 9,996 square feet and the
actual square footage of the lot, which difference is 111 square
feet.
3.

The Trial Court's findings contain no mention that

the representation in Exhibit P-27 "room for a pool" was false or
that such falsity resulted in damages to the Plaintiffs.

In other

words,

been

if

the

Plaintiffs

felt

that

there

had

a

misrepresentation that the lot contained adequate room for a pool,
the record is silent as to whether or not that is or is not true.
No evidence was presented by the Plaintiffs to show that a pool
could not have been constructed within the boundaries of the lot as
purchased by the Plaintiffs.

In addition, no effort is made by the

Trial Court to state that because there was no room for a pool the
Plaintiffs have been damaged in the sum of $21,7 69.90.
4.

The finding that the Plaintiffs were entitled to

9,996 square feet of property is unsupported by the testimony of
the

Plaintiffs

themselves.

The Plaintiffs

admitted

that, if

anything, the representation made to them regarding the boundary
line of the lot was within "a couple of feet" of the trees.
178.)

On

cross

examination,

Mr. Forsberg

admitted

(R.

that the

furthest distance between the home and the trees was 4 5 feet. This
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distance was placed by the Plaintiff on Exhibit P-3 5, as shown on
Appendix 2 attached hereto.

Therefore, if the Plaintiffs were

entitled to anything, it was to the difference between the actual
property boundary and the line of trees. The Plaintiffs should not
be

granted

a

greater

remedy

than

that

which

their

own

representation allows.
Unfortunately, there was no testimony given by the Plaintiffs
as to what the distance between the actual boundary line and the
line of trees was.

It clearly was not 45 feet.

It clearly was not

98 feet. Most importantly, it clearly could not stand as the basis
for entering a judgment of $21,769.90.
5.

The Finding regarding 9,996 square feet is further

defeated by the Plaintiffs1 own words.

Mr. Forsberg said that his

concern was that the backyard be "spacious". He then admitted that
to him forty feet of backyard was "spacious".

On Exhibit P-35, he

then admits that the distance to the farthest tree was forty-five
feet.

By his own definition, the backyard to the trees met his

needs and expectations.

Yet, the Trial Court granted judgment for

an additional forty-five feet of lost property.
The judgment of the Trial Court exceeded the testimony of the
Plaintiffs and the evidence presented at trial.

At the very best,

assuming that a misrepresentation occurred and assuming that there
was

justifiable reliance, the Plaintiffs were entitled

to the

difference between the actual boundary of the property and fortyfive feet.

The Plaintiffs had the burden to give the Trial Court

a calculation as to that amount of property.

24

Instead, the Trial

Court granted

to the Plaintiffs

a judgment of the difference

between the actual boundary of the property and 98 feet.

There is

no support for this calculation or judgment in the record.

The

Trial Court must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that these Appellants have met
their duty and burden on appeal to marshall all of the evidence in
favor of the conclusions of the Trial Court and to demonstrate the
insufficiency of that evidence. This matter was tried to the Trial
Court over a period of several weeks, with long delays in between
trial days.

Testimony was presented on June 23, June 24 and part

of June 25.

The matter was not taken up again until July 14, 15

and 16.

An additional day of trial was held on July 21.

Decision of the Trial Court was issued on July 31.

The

At the time of

his Decision, the Trial Judge did not have, at his disposal, any
accurate transcription of the testimony which had been given over
a month previously.

Surely, the Trial Judge could not have been

expected to have accurately recalled the testimony on the issue of
lot size and the supposed misrepresentations.

As has been shown,

the evidence did not measure up to the requisite specificity upon
which the Trial Court could make its Findings on this issue.
Unlike other cases, this is not a matter where the credibility
of

the

witnesses

was

in

question.

Because

the

witnesses

essentially agreed on the major points, the Trial Court did not
need to make a determination as to who was telling the truth and
who was not.

The undisputed evidence was simply not enough to
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support a finding and conclusion as to negligent misrepresentation.
The Trial Court's Findings should be reversed and the matter
remanded with instructions to dismiss the misrepresentation claim.
DATED this 23rd day of December, 1593

DOANE R. SMITJT
Attorney for Appellants
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PANORAMIC VIEWS from almost every room in this new home in .Benchmark.
Be the first owner of these gorgeous hardwood floors, customised kitchen
with adjoining family room, and all that is included in this exciting
three-level contemporary design. Vaulted ceilings, light, bright and
spacious as designed by architect David Rohovit. Some of the details include:

Price:

Reduced to $260,000.00

Construction:

Brick and stucco with charming lattice-work
trim.

Style:

Customized three-level contemporary.

Entry Level:

Gorgeous entry dnto living room with fireplace,
formal dining, kitchen/family room, office or
library with fabulous three-quarter bath.

Second Level:

Master suite and bath with Jacuzzi tub, separate
s h o w : , and double sinks. Two additional bedrooms and full bath, largo laundry room with
sink, and cozy family room with fireplace. Room
under garage could be a terrific exercise area.

Third Level:

An additional 1,072 square feet of unfinished
space allowing for family expansion or game
rooms, storage, etc. Walk-out to level back
yard area.

Square Footage:

Main: 1,590 1st Level: 1,500 2nd Level: 1,072
3,090 Finished Square Feet

Yard Size:

95 f x 102', fiat back yard with room for a pooi.

Garage:

Two-car and parking pad.

Schools:

Beacon Heights Elementary
Hillside Junior High
Highland High

Imagine having dinner cr. this beautiful deck overlooking the valley! The
quality of this heme speaks for itself.
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